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American Law Schools
in a Time of Transition
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Being dean of an American law school these days is no easy task. To name
a few of the challenges:
The economic model for law schools is breaking down because of the
collapse of the job market for new lawyers, making it difficult to justify ever
increasing tuition levels.
The American Bar Association is contemplating changing standards for law
school accreditation. Concern has been expressed that the implicit requirement
that most law school teaching be done by tenured and tenure-track faculty
will be eliminated—a change that could have profound implications for the
academic freedom of faculty members and their engagement in important
public policy debates.
Finally, law schools are under pressure to diversify their student bodies and
faculties with racial/ethnic and socioeconomic dimensions in mind.
But the challenges American law schools face are not unique. Because they
are part of a much broader higher education system, there are lessons from
that broader academic experience that may prove useful to them.
What’s Been Happening in American Higher Education?
During the last three decades, undergraduate tuition levels increased each
year, on average, by 3.5 percent more than the rate of inflation at private fouryear academic institutions. The comparable increases for public four-year and
public two-year institutions were 5.1 percent and 3.5 percent, respectively.1
Tuition increases in private higher education have been associated over
this period with increased real expenditures per student. In public higher
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Sandy Baum & Jennifer Ma, College Board, Trends in College Pricing fig. 4 (2011), available
at http://trends.collegeboard.org/downloads/College_Pricing_2011.pdf.
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education, as I detail below, tuition increases often only have helped to
compensate for reductions in state support.2
I have discussed extensively elsewhere the forces that cause private and
public undergraduate tuition levels to continually increase at rates that exceed
the rate of inflation, as measured by the rate of increase in the Consumer Price
Index.3 For private institutions, they include:
• The aspirations of academic institutions, similar to other nonprofit
institutions, to be the very best they can be in every measure of their
activities, calling for ever increasing resources.
• The perception by students and parents that where they go to college is
almost as important as whether they go, and the belief that higher priced
selective private institutions confer unique educational and economic
advantages on their students. This leads to large applicant pools and
only limited market pressures to slow tuition increases and it provides a
cover for less selective institutions to raise tuition.4
• Published rankings, such as those of U.S. News & World Report, which
are based partly on institutional expenditures per student, and thus lead
to an arms race of spending.
• The growth of technology which often comes at a high cost and leads
to improvements in the quality of higher education. But these quality
changes are not reflected in the rate of increase in tuition because—unlike
2.

Donna M. Desrochers, Colleen M. Lenihan & Jane V. Wellman, Delta Coast Project,
Trends in College Spending 1998-2008 5 (2010), available at http://www.deltacostproject.org/
resources/pdf/Trends-in-College-Spending-98-08.pdf.

3.

See, for example, Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising: Why College Costs So Much
(Harvard Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising]; Ronald G. Ehrenberg,
The Perfect Storm and the Privatization of Public Higher Education (Cornell Univ. Press
2005); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, What’s Happening to Public Higher Education? The Shifting
Financial Burden (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2007); Ronald G. Ehrenberg, The Economics
of Tuition and Fees in American Higher Education (Cornell Univ. Press 2007); B. Archibald
& David H. Feldman, Why Does College Cost So Much? (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).

4.

Most studies, find that high priced selective private institutions confer educational and
economic advantages on their students. Dominic J. Brewer, Eric R. Eide & Ronald G.
Ehrenberg, Does it Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Cross-Cohort Evidence of the
Effects of College Type on Earnings, 34 J. Hum. Resources 104 (1998) [hereinafter Brewer et
al., Cross-Cohort Evidence], available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/~mustard/courses/e8420/
Ehrenberg-JHR.pdf; and Eric R. Eide, Dominic J. Brewer & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Does it
Pay to Attend an Elite Private College? Evidence of the Effects of Undergraduate College
Quality on Graduate School Attendance, 17 Econ. Educ. Rev. 371, 371-76 (1998), available at
http://nersp.osg.ufl.edu/~lombardi/edudocs/eide.pdf. The only studies that find contrary
evidence are Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More
Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q. J.
Econ. 1491 (2002) [hereinafter Dale & Krueger, Estimating the Payoff], available at http://web.
missouri.edu/~podgurskym/Econ_4345/syl_articles/berg_krueger_selective_college.
pdf; and Stacy Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Returns to College Selectivity over
the Career Using Administrative Earnings Data, National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 17159 (2011), available at http://inpathways.net/return_on_selectivity.
pdf.
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with the Consumer Price Index—adjustments are not made for quality
when rates of tuition increases are figured.
All of these factors apply to public higher education institutions as well,
plus the pressure that cutbacks in state support put on tuition.
The nature of faculty positions has also changed dramatically during the
last 30 to 40 years. The percentage of faculty nationwide that is full-time has
declined from almost 80 percent in 1970 to 51.3 percent in 2007 and the vast
majority of part-time faculty members do not have Ph.D.s.5 The percentage
of full-time faculty not on tenure track has doubled between 1975 and 2007,
increasing from 18.6 percent to 37.2 percent.6 As a result, today only about onethird of the faculty teaching at American colleges and universities are full-time
and tenured or on tenure-track appointments.
Why did this change in faculty composition happen during a period when
undergraduate tuition levels increased in real terms, on average? Part of the
reason is that the tuition discount rate—the share of each tuition dollar that
institutions return to undergraduates in the form of need-based or merit grant
aid—increased substantially at private four-year institutions. For example, the
average tuition discount rate for full-time first-year students at private fouryear institutions reached 42 percent in the fall of 2008. The comparable figure
in the fall of 1990 was 26.7 percent.7 Much of the increase in tuition revenues
at private colleges and universities has been plowed back into undergraduate
aid. At all but a handful of the wealthiest private schools, the vast majority of
undergraduate financial aid dollars come largely from tuition revenue.
The wealthiest and most selective private colleges, which have no problems
achieving their desired enrollment levels, dramatically increased the generosity
of their financial aid policies during the period in response to evidence that
relatively small fractions of their students were coming from lower- and lower
middle-income families.8 These institutions also were influenced by rapid
growth rates in their endowments during much of the period and by their
relatively low endowment spending rates (which led to pressure from the
U.S. Senate Finance Committee for them to increase endowment spending
on financial aid). Dramatic increases in the financial need of their applicants
because of the decline in family incomes and assets after the financial collapse
5.

Thomas D. Snyder & Sally A. Dillow, United States Department of Education, Digest of
Education Statistics 2009 (2010), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010013_0.pdf.

6.

Amer. Assn. of Univ. Professors, Trends in Faculty Status, 1975-2007, available at http://www.
aaup.org/our-work/research.

7.

National Assn. of College and Univ. Business Officers, Newly Released NACUBO Tuition
Discounting Study Survey Report Shows Rates Remain Stable (2009), available at http://
www.nacubo.org/Research/Research_News/Newly_Released_NACUBO_Tuition_
Discounting_Survey_Report_Shows_Rates_Remain_Stable.html; National Assn. of
College and Univ. Business Officers, 2009 NACUBO Tuition Discounting Study of
Independent Institutions (2010).

8.

Beckie Supiano & Andrea Fuller, Elite Colleges Fail to Gain More Students on Pell Grants,
Chron. Higher Educ., Mar. 27, 2011, at 57.
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in 2008 also was a factor. Other private institutions, which use need-based
and merit aid to craft their classes and to achieve desired enrollment levels,
found that market forces do matter. Competition from lower-priced public
institutions along with stagnating real family income levels during much of
the period followed by declines in family incomes and assets after the financial
collapse dramatically increased the need to raise grant aid and offer tuition
discounts both to fill classes and to achieve the desired mix of students.9
In public higher education, tuition increases have barely offset a long
decline in student state appropriations. In fiscal year 2010, state appropriations
per full-time equivalent student at public higher educational institutions
averaged $6,454, a 19 percent decline from the peak year of fiscal 1987 when
the comparable number was $7,993.10 Even before the impact of the Great
Recession, real state appropriations per full-time equivalent student were still
lower in fiscal year 2008 than they were 20 years earlier. Overall, the sum of
net tuition revenue and state appropriations per full-time equivalent student
at public institutions was roughly the same in real terms in fiscal 2010 as it was
in fiscal 1987.11
In addition, academic institutions have changed how they allocate their
resources. The share of institutional expenditures going to faculty salaries and
benefits in both public and private institutions has fallen relative to that going
to non-faculty uses such as student services, academic support and institutional
support.12 Some observers have attributed this to administrative bloat and the
declining influence of the faculty on decision making at universities.13 However,
after experiencing the collapse of financial markets in 2008 and the Great
Recession, many universities have hired external consultants to advise them
on how to reduce administrative costs and are taking serious steps to do so.
My own university, for example, is well on the way to reducing administrative
costs on its Ithaca campus by between $75 million and $85 million a year.
This represents 5 percent to 6 percent of its base annual operating budget,
excluding external research funding. I must caution, however, that one-time
reductions in administrative costs will not slow the rate of tuition increases.
Continuous reductions in costs will be required to do that.
All of these things are occurring at a time when American higher education
is facing enormous pressures. Our nation’s economic growth and prosperity
9.

While tuition levels rose in percentage terms by more at the four-year public institutions
than they did at the four-year private schools during the period, because tuition levels were
so much lower at the public schools at the start of the period, dollar increases in tuition were
much larger at the private schools and the difference between public and private tuition
levels (in real terms) increased during the period.

10.

State Higher Education Executive Officers, State Higher Education Finance: FY 2010
(2011), fig. 3, available at http://www.sheeo.org/finance/shef_fy10.pdf.

11.

Id.

12.

Desrochers et al., supra note 2, at 18-19.

13.

Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fall of the Faculty; The Rise of the All-Administrative University
and Why It Matters (Oxford Univ. Press 2011).
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during the 20th century was driven by the fact that we led the world in terms
of the share of our population that had college degrees.14 But other nations
have overtaken us and today we rank no higher than 12 among 36 developed
nations in the share of our young adult population with college degrees.15
The groups in our population that are growing most rapidly—people of color,
immigrants and people from relatively low income families—have historically
been underrepresented in higher education. Improving access and college
graduation rates is essential for our nation’s prosperity in an increasingly
competitive and a knowledge-based economy. Concerns that high rates of
tuition growth will prevent us from achieving our goals, coupled with the
decline in income and assets caused by the Great Recession, are putting
pressure on private and public higher education institutions to limit tuition
increases.
Public colleges and universities, where the vast majority of American
undergraduate students are educated, face pressures to increase enrollments
and graduation rates at the same time that state support is being cut. A
growing private for-profit higher education sector which now enrolls almost
10 percent of all students has attracted primarily adult learners interested in
education leading to careers. The largest players, including the University of
Phoenix, have been among the leaders in restructuring education through the
use of technology to improve learning and reduce costs. Notable efforts from
the nonprofit sector to similarly do so include the work of the National Center
for Academic Transformation16 and the Open Learning Initiative at Carnegie
Mellon University.17
The for-profits also have been among the leaders in reducing reliance on
tenure and tenure-track faculty, seeking to measure learning outcomes and
evaluating instructors based on what their students learn. Recent research
concluded that very little learning actually occurs for many American students
in higher education and this has added to the pressures for accountability that
academic institutions now face.18 Colleges and universities are increasingly
being asked to provide information on how they assess learning outcomes as
part of the accreditation process.
Possible Reduced Reliance on Tenure and Tenure-Track Faculty
Proposed accreditation guidelines from the Standards Revision Committee
of the American Bar Association would remove language that many faculty
14.

Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Race Between Education and Technology
(Belknap Press 2008).

15.

Tamar Lewin, Once a Leader, U.S. Lags in College Degrees, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2010, at
A11.

16.

See http://www.thenatcat.org.

17.

See http://oli.web.cmu.edu/openlearning/initiative.

18.

Richard Arum & Josipa Roska, Academically Adrift: Limited Learning on American
Campuses (Univ. of Chicago Press 2011).
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members—but not the ABA committee—have interpreted as requiring law
schools to maintain a tenure system and to have most law school teaching
conducted by full-time law school faculty.19
A traditional argument for the importance of a tenure system for faculty is
based on academic freedom. Absent tenure and the job security it provides
faculty members may be reluctant to pursue research on—or to engage in—
public debate over controversial issues. Michael Olivas eloquently expressed
this view in his presidential address to the American Association of Law
Schools in 2011. And if one wanted to single out a single academic discipline
in which such academic freedom is absolutely essential, it certainly would be
law, where many faculty members debate and write about controversial public
policy issues frequently.20
The importance of this rationale for tenure was brought home to me
personally in the late 1970s when several trustees at my own institution
challenged my promotion to professor because they disagreed with testimony
I had given in a New York State regulatory proceeding.21 President Frank
Rhodes, who had arrived at Cornell only a few months earlier and who had
never met me, suggested to the trustees that academic decisions were best
left to academics and my promotion went through. The Cornell Trustees as
a body shortly thereafter formally took the position, which it has repeatedly
reaffirmed over the years, that academic decisions are best left to academics
and that the final decisions on individual tenure and promotion cases are to
be made by the provost and the president of Cornell, with the trustees giving
only pro forma approval.
Economists have developed a number of other arguments that can be used
to support the importance of tenure systems. Because a tenure system provides
senior faculty with some job security, they have an incentive to fully share
their expertise with junior colleagues and students without fear of creating
competitors who will challenge their positions. In this way, tenure facilitates
the intergenerational transmission and expansion of knowledge.22
The tenure system can also be thought of as an implicit long-term contract
model or a winner-take-all tournament model; both of these models provide
incentives for all faculty members to work harder than otherwise would
be the case.23 Labor economists would argue that tenure is a desirable job
19.

Scott Jaschik, Law School Tenure in Danger, Inside Higher Ed, July 26, 2010, available at
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2010/07/26/law.

20.

Michael Olivas, Academic Freedom and Academic Duty, AALS News, March 2011, available
at http://www.als.org/services-newsletter-presMarch11.php.

21.

The incident is described in Ehrenberg, Tuition Rising, supra note 3, at 127.

22.

George J. Stigler, The Intellectual and the Marketplace 1-9 (Harvard Univ. Press 1984).

23.

Edward P. Lazear, Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 1261 (1979), available
at
http://www.oeaw.ac.at/vid/download/fuernkranz/lazear_mandatory_retirement.pdf;
Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts,
89 J. Pol. Econ. 841 (1981), available at http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/persone/Natale/
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characteristic and, in its absence, academic institutions would have to pay
higher salaries to attract faculty of a given quality. Indeed, research that I and
two collaborators have done suggests that, after controlling for other factors
that influence salaries, economics departments that offer lower probabilities of
tenure have to pay higher starting salaries to attract new faculty.24
While these arguments supporting a tenure system are important, one
may reasonably ask this question: Why should the typical college student be
taught by a researcher on the frontier of his field when the material the student
is being taught may be miles inside the frontier? Doesn’t heavy reliance on
tenured and tenure-track faculty needlessly raise the cost of undergraduate
education? Put simply, what is lost if undergraduate students are taught by
adjuncts or full-time but not tenure-track faculty while a smaller number of
tenure-track faculty focuses on research and graduate education?
Only recently have economists and other social scientists begun to address
this issue and their findings suggest there is no such thing as a “free lunch” in
higher education. For example, Liang Zhang and I studied institutional-level
data for a number of years. After controlling for other factors, we found that,
when a four-year academic institution increases its use of either full-time faculty
not on tenure track or part-time instructors, its undergraduate students’ firstyear persistence rates and graduation rates decreased.25 Several other studies
have found that greater reliance on part-time faculty reduces both graduation
rates for two-year students and the likelihood they will transfer to four-year
colleges.26 Still other studies have found that both public two- and four-year
college students who take “adjunct heavy” first year class schedules are less
likely to persist in college after the first year.27
Not all studies suggest that adjuncts always adversely influence academic
outcomes. For example, Bettinger and Long,28 in a study that may be
economia_del_personale/Letture%5CLR81.pdf.
24.

Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Paul J. Pieper & Rachel A. Willis, Do Economics Departments with
Lower Tenure Probabilities Pay Higher Faculty Salaries?, 80 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 503, 503-12
(1998).

25.

Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Liang Zhang, Do Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty Matter?, 40 J.
Hum. Resources 647 (2005).

26.

Daniel Jacoby, Effects of Part-Time Faculty Employment on Community College Graduation
Rates, 77 J. Higher Educ. 1081, 1081-1103 (2006); M. Kevin Eagan, Jr. & Audrey J. Jaeger,
Effects of Exposure to Part-Time Faculty on Community College Transfer, 50 Res. Higher
Educ. 168 (2009); Audrey J. Jaeger & M. Kevin Eagan, Jr., Unintended Consequences:
Examining the Effect of Part-Time Faculty Members on Associate’s Degree Completion, 36
Community C. Rev. 167 (2009).

27.

Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, The Increased Use of Adjunct Instructors at Public
Universities: Are We Hurting Students, in What’s Happening to Higher Education? 51-70
(Ehrenberg ed., Greenwood Press 2007); Audrey J. Jaeger & M. Kevin Eagan, Jr., Examining
Retention and Contingent Faculty Use in a State System of Public Higher Education, 25
Educ. Pol’y 507 (2011).

28.

Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, Does Cheaper Mean Better: The Impact of Using
Adjunct Instructors on Student Outcomes, 92 Rev. of Econ. and Stat. 598 (2010).
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particularly relevant to legal education, showed that having an adjunct as an
instructor in an introductory class in some professional fields increases the
likelihood that a student will take additional classes in the field.
Given that many full-time, non-tenure faculty members are dedicated
teachers and can devote themselves fully to undergraduate education because
they do not have any research responsibilities, why might they adversely affect
student outcomes as many of these studies suggest? Typically their teaching
loads are higher than tenure-track faculty members, which may leave them
with less time to work with individual students outside of class or to keep
up with new developments in their fields. Adjunct faculty appointments are
often ad hoc in nature and instructors trying to eke out a living from this type
of work often must take on much heavier teaching loads, sometimes spread
across multiple institutions in urban areas. This leaves them little time and
often no place to meet students but in the classroom.29 They also are less likely
to be up to date on their department’s curriculum and therefore may be less
prepared to advise students.
However, what appears to be true for undergraduate education is not
necessarily true for legal education. Adjuncts in law schools are typically
practicing lawyers who bring professional knowledge to the classroom.
Non-tenure track, full-time faculty in law schools are often found in clinical
areas. Would adoption of an accreditation standard that deemphasized the
importance of tenured and tenure-track faculty actually have any adverse
effect on law students’ education?
To answer such a question requires one to specify what the outcomes of
legal education are and then to estimate whether the composition of faculty
at a law school influences these outcomes. During the past year a group of
undergraduate and graduate students and I took a first stab at doing this.
We obtained the data to conduct our research from the Official Guide to ABA
Approved Law Schools. The most recent year’s data was available on the Law
School Admission Council website, five previous years’ data were obtained
electronically from the ABA, and data for an additional eight years came from
published volumes of the Guide.30
The law school performance measures available in the Guide were the
attrition rate of first-year students for academic reasons and the bar passage
rate for first-time test takers from the law school for the jurisdiction in which
the largest numbers of its students took the bar exam. We adjusted the latter
rate by comparing it to that state’s average bar pass rate for first-time test
takers.31
29.

Liang Zhang & Xiangmin Liu, Faculty Employment at 4-Year Colleges and Universities, 29
Econ. Educ. Rev. 543 (2010) (showing that four-year academic institutions in urban areas
make more use of part-time faculty than other four-year institutions).

30.

I am grateful to Kenneth Williams at the ABA for providing us with the electronic data.

31.

In computing this variable we first recalculated the state average pass rate removing the
school’s test takers and test passers from the data.
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The Guide’s faculty categorization was not ideal for our study.32 These
categories are: the shares of faculty who are “full-time,” “other full-time,” “deans
and librarians and others who teach” and “part-time.” The full-time faculty
measure included not only tenure and tenure-track faculty but also clinical and
other faculty on multiyear appointments, as well as visitors temporarily filling
“full-time” slots. The “other full-time” faculty measure included other people
teaching full-time to whom no multi-year commitment had been made.
Nonetheless, we estimated whether either the academic attrition rate
measure or our “adjusted” bar passage rate measures were associated with the
shares of faculty at an institution from the different groups.33 Our equations
attempted to control for other factors that might be related to the outcomes,
including student GPA and LSAT scores and, in some specifications, the
gender/racial/ethnic distribution of students. We found no evidence from our
analyses that the distribution of faculty across the types that were available to
us had any effect on the first-year academic attrition rates or the adjusted bar
passage rates of graduates of the institutions.
I must emphasize that the data we were using were inadequate to address
the question of whether full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty matter.
We did not have information on the share of faculty that were tenured
or on tenure-track. Equally problematic, we had no information on the
characteristics of faculty who were teaching first-year classes—the classes that
would be most relevant in determining attrition after the first-year. We also
had no information on the characteristics of faculty teaching basic second-year
survey classes, which along with the first-year classes, cover the majority of the
material that appears on bar exams. In theory, one could obtain information
on the characteristics of the relevant faculty from copies of the annual AALS
Directory of Law Teachers, but to do so in a cost efficient way would require the
AALS to allow researchers access to electronic versions of the Directory.
I also make no claim that the student performance measures we used are
the best available. The AALS might profitably address what better measures
might be used. One might consider, for example, job market outcomes.
Studies using job market outcomes would be akin to large numbers of studies
by economists that seek to ascertain if labor market earnings of college
graduates are related to the characteristics of the undergraduate institutions
they attended.34 As is commonly known, however, published data on the share
of a law school’s graduates who are employed and their salary levels have come
under attack and better earnings data will need to be collected before one can
focus on this outcome. What seems clear, however, is that before seriously
32.

I am grateful to Richard Robinson, Associate Dean for Administration and Finance at the
Cornell Law School for helping me to understand the classifications of faculty in the Guide
and the years to which various data elements refer.

33.

We used the faculty shares for the year the students were first-year students in the attrition
equation and experimented with these shares and the average shares over the three years
they were enrolled in law school in the bar passage equations.

34.

Brewer et al., Cross-Cohort Evidence, supra note 4 at 104-23; Dale & Krueger, supra note 4.
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proposing accreditation standards that decrease reliance on tenure and tenuretrack faculty the ABA should want to know the answer to the question: “Do
tenured and tenure-track faculty matter in law schools?”
Diversifying Law School Faculty
American higher education institutions are trying to diversify their faculties
across race, gender and ethnic lines. If talent is equally distributed across all
groups, to do otherwise would not provide maximum faculty quality. While role
models for students do not have to be of the same race, gender and ethnicity,
some (but not all) research relating to undergraduate students suggests that
female students are more likely to persist in science and engineering fields
if the instructor in their introductory class is female. Analogous results were
found in one study for African American students and African American
professors.35A recent New York Law Review survey suggests that law schools with
a high percentage of full-time female faculty members had a larger percentage
of female students on their flagship law reviews.36
In a recent study, colleagues and I also addressed the role that the leaders
of American colleges and universities—trustees, presidents and provosts—play
in influencing the rate at which academic institutions diversify their faculties
across gender lines.37 While a much more direct role in faculty hiring is played
by faculty search committees, department chairs and deans, presidents and
provosts establish the “rules of the game” for faculty searches and make their
expectations clear in terms of efforts to diversify. Trustees in turn make clear
what their goals are for the institution during the process of hiring a president
and monitor the institution’s and the president’s progress in meeting these
goals. It is now quite common for trustees to require an annual report on
faculty diversity efforts.
Using institutional level data spanning the 1984-2007 period in our study
for a set of four-year colleges and universities, we estimated whether the
35.

Examples include Kevin N. Rask & Elizabeth M. Bailey, Are Faculty Role Models?
Evidence from Major Choice in an Undergraduate Institution, 33 J. Econ. Educ. 99 (2002);
Scott E. Carrell, Marianne E. Page & James E. West, Sex and Science: How Professor
Gender Perpetuates the Gender Gap, 125 Q. J. Econ. 101 (2010); Joshua Price, The Effect of
Instructor Race and Gender on Student Persistence in STEM Fields, 29 Econ. Educ. Rev.
901, 901-910 (2010). Studies concluding that the gender match of faculty and students does
not enhance female students’ persistence include Brandice J. Canes & Harvey S. Rosen,
Following in Her Footsteps: Faculty Gender Composition and Women’s Choice of Majors,
48 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 484 (1995); Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget Terry Long, Do Faculty
Serve as Role Models? The Impact of Instructor Gender on Female Students, 95 American
Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 152, 152-157 (2005); Amanda L. Griffith,
Persistence of Women and Minorities in STEM Field Majors: Is it the School that Matters?,
29 Econ. Educ. Rev. 911, 911-921 (2010).

36.

Karen Sloan, Faculty Diversity Means Gains for Female Law Students According to
Study, Nat’l L. J., Nov. 2, 2011, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.
jsp?id=1202523658844.

37.

Ehrenberg et al., Diversifying the Faculty Across Gender Lines: Do Trustees and
Administrators Matter?, 31 Economics of Education Review 9-18 (February 2012).
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gender of the president and the provost, as well as the share of trustees who
were female influenced the rate at which the institution diversified its faculty
across gender lines. We controlled for other variables that might be expected
to influence this rate (for example, a measure of the expected share of new
hires that should be female based upon the “female Ph.D. intensity” of the
fields in which the institution employed faculty). We found that institutions
with either female presidents or provosts, as well as those with a greater share
of female trustees increased the female share of their faculties at a more rapid
rate over the period. We also found that the magnitude of the effects of these
leaders is larger at smaller institutions, where central administrators typically
play a greater role in faculty hiring decisions, and that a critical mass of female
trustees—at least 25 percent—had to be reached, before the gender composition
of the board mattered.
Earlier studies by social scientists had also found evidence that the gender
composition of deans and department chairs appeared to influence the rate
at which new female faculty were hired.38 My students and I knew from the
AALS Statistical Reports on Law Faculty that in 1990-91 only 8.5 percent of law
school deans were female and only 6.8 percent were people of color. By 200708, these percentages had risen respectively to 19.8 and 12.7. These changes
led us to wonder if we could adapt the methodology used in our paper to
estimate whether the gender of the dean at a law school influences the rate at
which the school diversifies its faculty across gender lines and, similarly, if the
race/ethnicity of the dean influences the rate at which the school diversifies its
faculty across racial/ethnic lines.
Through online searches of Directory of Law Teachers, my students identified
the gender and minority status of the dean of each ABA accredited law school
each year from 1997-98 to 2010-2011. They then estimated equations using
institutional level data in which the change in the share of the full-time faculty
(obtained from issues of the Official Guide) that was female between two years
was specified to be a function of the gender of the dean and of the initial year’s
share of female faculty. They conducted similar analyses for changes in the
share of faculty that were minority using the minority status of the dean as
the key explanatory variable. In none of the specifications that they estimated
did they find any evidence that the gender of the dean significantly influenced
the rate at which the gender distribution of the full-time faculty changed nor
did they find any evidence that having a minority dean influenced the rate at
which the share of the full-time faculty that was minority changed.
There are compelling reasons to try to diversify the leadership of law
schools that go beyond changing the rate at which law schools diversify their
38.
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faculty so our evidence should not be interpreted as suggesting that efforts
to diversify law school leadership should be reduced. Moreover, once again
our research is not the definitive work on the topic. Changes in faculty shares
results from hiring decisions, from decisions by faculty to move to other law
schools, to accept nonacademic employment and to retire. Law schools also
make decisions not to grant tenure to tenure-track faculty.
In addition, the gender and race/ethnic mixes of candidates for a law
school faculty vacancy will depend on the specialty that school seeks to fill.
For example, in 2007-08, 87.9 percent of antitrust law professors were male,
but only 38.4 percent of family law professors were male. If the gender
distributions of lawyers seeking faculty positions in antitrust and family law
are similar to current faculty distributions, the likelihood that a vacant position
will be filled by a female is much higher if the position is in family law than if
it is in antitrust law.
These considerations suggest that if the AALS is interested in conducting
a better designed study of the impact of the gender and minority status of law
school deans on diversifying their faculties, it will need to provide researchers
with access to individual-level data on new hires from the Directory of Law Teachers,
along with data on the “availability” of job applicants by gender and minority
status that might be obtained from both the Directory and the Faculty Registry.
Future studies might also profitably take into account that the responsibilities
of law school deans are varied and it is possible that the key individuals whose
gender and race/ethnicity might matter are the associate or assistant deans
in charge of academic affairs and faculty hiring, along with faculty search
committee chairs.
Ever Increasing Law School Tuition
The ABA Commission on the Impact of the Economic Crisis on the
Profession and Legal Needs is well aware that law school tuition, like
undergraduate tuition, has risen substantially relative to the rate of inflation.39
What is not as well known is that law school tuition has also increased
substantially relative to undergraduate tuition in the last two decades.
During the period between 1990 and 2009, average private law school
tuition rose by 5.9 percent a year, while average private undergraduate tuition
rose by half a percentage point less a year. Similarly while a weighted average
of resident and nonresident public undergraduate tuition levels rose by about
6.8 percent a year during the period, average public resident and nonresident
law school tuition levels rose by 9.1 and 7.5 percent a year, respectively.40
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Why has this occurred? One possibility is that law school faculty salaries
have increased more than faculty salaries in other academic disciplines and
that higher tuition levels were necessary to attract and retain top law school
faculty. I am not privy to data on salaries of faculty at private law schools but
average salaries of faculty by discipline, including law, from a set of public
universities and land grant colleges that are collected annually by the Office
of Institutional Research and Management at Oklahoma State University are
published periodically in Academe. English professors are a good comparison
group because the Oklahoma State data indicate that salaries in many other
fields have risen relative to those in English.
In 1991-92, the average salary of professors of law and legal studies was
about 154 percent of the average salary of professors in English. By 2009-2010,
the advantage of law professors had increased only slightly, to 159.5 percent.
The comparable salary ratio advantages at the assistant professor level were
179.2 percent in 1991-92 and 171.6 percent in 2009-2010. Thus, during the
period, salaries of assistant professors of law and legal studies actually fell a bit
relative to those of assistant professors of English.41 While these data are only
for public institutions, they do not provide strong support for the proposition
that more rapid increases in law school tuitions were attributable to the need
to raise revenue for law school faculty salaries.
As I mentioned earlier, a large fraction of undergraduate tuition at private
colleges and universities goes back to undergraduate students in the form of
need-based or merit-based financial aid. Indeed the wealthiest private schools
have eliminated all loans from the financial aid packages of undergraduate
students. In contrast, the debt loads that law school graduates have been
assuming are extraordinary. A cursory look at the data included in the most
recent U.S. News & World Report academic rankings show that almost half of ABAaccredited law schools reported that 2010 graduates who incurred law school
debt averaged more than $100,000 in loans. The percentages of graduates with
law school debt at these schools ranged from 61 to 99.
These numbers suggest that the typical private law school is probably not
giving back as great a share of its tuition dollars in the form of grant aid as
the typical private undergraduate institution. But I may be wrong. The Official
Guide provides information on the share of recent students receiving grants
or aid and the median amount of this aid for each law school. I checked the
numbers for private law schools in New York State and found that between
36 percent and 75 percent of their students received aid, with the median grant
level for full-time students ranging from $7,500 to $20,000. If private law
schools have used higher tuition to provide increased aid to students, it would
be prudent for them to share this information with potential applicants.
Cutbacks in state support for higher education at public universities have
often been larger at professional schools, such as law, than for undergraduate
education. From the perspective of state policy makers, larger cuts for
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professional schools make sense because more highly educated individuals are
more mobile and less likely to remain in the state and pay taxes after graduation
than are college graduates.42 Disproportionate cuts in state support for public
law schools may partly explain their higher rates of tuition increases compared
to public undergraduate students.
More likely, tuition increases at both public and private law schools have
been driven by the same two forces that drive tuition increases in undergraduate
education—the quest to accumulate resources so institutions can be the best
they can be and the quest for prestige that is driven largely by published
rankings of law schools, such as those of the U.S News & World Report. A ranking
scheme that is partly based on the resources devoted to educating students
puts pressure on law schools to spend more. A ranking scheme that is partly
based on student selectivity puts pressure on lower ranked law schools to try to
“buy” top students with merit aid.43 And a ranking system that is based partly
on peer assessments and assessment scores by lawyers and judges puts pressure
on law schools to be perceived as continually improving what they are doing
and to spend money to convey such information to external constituents.
Put simply, national law schools find themselves in a competitive arms race
of spending; any institution that unilaterally cuts spending or increases it at
a slower rate than its competitors will fall behind in the rankings. The past
promise of large earnings for law school graduates—much higher earnings
than those of typical college graduates—made potential law students willing
to pay rapidly increasing tuition. However, the collapse of the labor market
for new lawyers has greatly dampened the likelihood that future potential law
students will be willing to assume such large loan burdens, at least temporarily.
It is reasonable to project that law schools will have to moderate their rates of
increase in tuition, or dramatically increase the share of tuition revenues that
they give back in the form of grant aid.
When a rankings scheme is based on a variety of self-reported variables,
institutions have incentives to act to influence those variables so as to
improve their rankings. I have written extensively about steps undergraduate
institutions have taken to improve their U.S. News rankings—steps that may
require increased spending but that have no positive effect on students’
experiences. Institutions also examine all the data they are going to submit to
the magazine to see if there are legitimate things they can do that will make
their data “look better.”44 However, when institutions take actions to improve
42.
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their rankings that will mislead future applicants—such as allegations that
some law schools give their graduates temporary jobs to inflate the reported
employment probabilities—these institutions are coming close to violating
ethical norms. And when they intentionally provide inaccurate data, as a
number of law schools allegedly have done, they have definitely crossed the
line.45 Law schools should be synonymous with ethical behavior.
Because of obsessions with rankings and institutional prestige, many
American higher education leaders appear to have stopped thinking about the
important social role of higher education. Some leaders have kept their focus,
however. Cornell’s President David Skorton, for example, barely blinked when
I showed him data suggesting that, while Cornell’s undergraduate student body
was getting better each year, it was improving at a slower rate than those of our
competitors. Thus we were falling behind in student selectivity rankings and
probably needed to figure out how to alter our financial aid policies to attract
more top students. But when Skorton saw data in 2008 showing a decrease in
the share of our students who received Pell Grants—the federal undergraduate
grant program for students from lower- and lower middle-income families—
he dramatically increased the generosity of our grant aid programs for lower
income students. This while Cornell was suffering serious structural budget
deficit problems.
The controversies relating to the misreporting of law school data to U.S. News
should help to remind AALS members that obsession with the magazine’s law
school rankings is not in the social interest.
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